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Abstract—Data injection attacks have recently emerged as a
significant threat on the smart power grid. By launching data
injection attacks, an adversary can manipulate the real-time loca-
tional marginal prices to obtain economic benefits. Despite the surge
of existing literature on data injection, most such works assume
the presence of a single attacker and assume no cost for attack
or defense. In contrast, in this paper, a model for data injection
attacks with multiple adversaries and a single smart grid defender
is introduced. To study the defender-attackers interaction, two game
models are considered. In the first, a Stackelberg game model is
used in which the defender acts as a leader that can anticipate the
actions of the adversaries, that act as followers, before deciding on
which measurements to protect. The existence and properties of
the Stackelberg equilibrium of this game are studied. To find the
equilibrium, a distributed learning algorithm that operates under
limited system information is proposed and shown to converge to the
game solution. In the second proposed game model, it is considered
that the defender cannot anticipate the actions of the adversaries.
To this end, we proposed a hybrid satisfaction equilibrium - Nash
equilibrium game and defined its equilibrium concept. A search
algorithm is also provided to find the equilibrium of the hybrid
game. Numerical results using the IEEE 30-bus system are used
to illustrate and analyze the strategic interactions between the
attackers and defender. Our results show that by defending a
very small set of measurements, the grid operator can achieve an
equilibrium through which the optimal attacks have no effect on the
system. Moreover, our results show how, at equilibrium, multiple
attackers can play a destructive role towards each other, by choosing
to carry out attacks that cancel each other out, leaving the system
unaffected. In addition, we compared the obtained equilibrium
strategies under the Stackelberg and the hybrid models and we
characterized the amount of loss that the defender endures due to
its inability to anticipate the attackers’ actions.
Index Terms—Data injection attacks, smart grid security, game
theory, Stackelberg equilibrium, satisfaction equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent integration of advanced metering infrastructures,
data collection and communication nodes have rendered the
smart electric grid more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Particularly,
data injection attacks have recently emerged as an exceedingly
malicious type of cyber-attacks. Using data injection, malicious
adversaries can target the state estimator of a power system, by
targeting a number of measurement units, in order to alter the
estimate of the real-time system state [1], [2].
Data injection can significantly impact the overall well-being
of the power system since it can target the state estimator, an
integral component of the grid which is used by the system
operator to monitor, protect, control, and economically operate
the system [1], [2]. Using data injection attacks, malicious
adversaries can achieve a variety of goals that range from
compromising the security of the grid to impeding the real-
time operation of the system or making financial profit through
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energy prices manipulation. Data injection attacks are inherently
challenging due to their stealthiness which makes the task of
detecting them arduous [2]. In fact, data injection attacks can
modify the estimation process while remaining unnoticed by the
operator.
Recently, data injection attacks have attracted significant atten-
tion [1]–[5]. The work in [1] introduces a data injection scheme
that can evade detection when compromising a number of mea-
surements. The authors in [2] propose an optimal data injection
scheme and derive an optimized subset of measurements that
can be defended to face this attack. The work in [3] targets
coordinated attacks and discusses efforts for detecting those
attacks. An analysis of the economic effects of data injection
on energy markets is discussed in [4]. In [5], a zero-sum game
is formulated between an attacker and a defender in which the
attacker modifies an estimated line flow to manipulate prices.
While interesting, this existing body of literature [1]–[5] has
primarily focused on data injection attacks with a single attacker
and assume no cost for attacking or defending the system.
However, in practice, due to their potential profitability and
stealthiness, data injection attacks can occur concurrently from
multiple adversaries that can target various state estimation
sensors. Due to the networked nature of the smart grid, the
manipulation of measurements in one part of the system, by
an adversary, has an overall effect on the system as a whole.
Hence, an attack executed by one attacker does not only impact
the grid’s performance, but it also affects the benefits of the
other attackers. Such an interdependence can be, on the one
hand, beneficial to the grid for cases in which the different
simultaneous attacks mitigate the severity of one another. On the
other hand, multiple attacks can lead to a more severe combined
effect on the electric grid thus further impacting its overall
performance. Clearly, there is a necessity for a strategic modeling
framework to analyze and understand these interdependencies
between attackers. Remarkably, to our best knowledge, beyond
our preliminary works on data injection with two attackers in [6],
no work has analyzed the case of multiple adversaries.
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce novel
game-theoretic approaches to analyze data injection attacks that
involve a defender and multiple adversaries. In this regard, two
approaches are proposed. In the first approach, we formulate
the problem as a Stackelberg game in which the defender (i.e.
grid operator) acts as a leader having the ability to anticipate
the actions of the adversaries, which act as followers, prior to
selecting a subset of measurements to defend. The defender’s
goal is to reduce the effect of potential attacks on the system
while optimizing a utility that captures both the benefits and
costs of the chosen defense strategy. In response to the leader’s
strategy, the attackers play a noncooperative strategic game in
which each attacker chooses its optimal attack scheme in order
to maximize the trade off between the benefits, obtained from
prices manipulation, and costs associated with the attack. We
prove the existence of a generalized Nash equilibrium for the
attacker’s game and we study the existence and properties of
the overall game’s Stackelberg equilibrium. To solve the game,
we propose a distributed learning algorithm which we prove to
converge to a solution of the game using limited information
that can be available to the players. In the second approach,
it is assumed that the defender cannot anticipate the actions
of the adversary. To this end, we use the framework of satis-
faction equilibrium [7] through a proposed hybrid satisfaction
equilibrium - Nash equilibrium game model. In this approach,
rather than anticipating the attackers’ response and playing a
strategy that optimizes its objective function, the defender seeks
a defense strategy that meets a certain performance constraint.
We introduce an equilibrium concept of this game and propose
a search algorithm to find this equilibrium.
The performance of the proposed frameworks is assessed
via numerical simulations using the IEEE 30-bus test system.
Through the numerical analysis, we simulate the strategic inter-
actions between the attackers and defender over the test system.
We show that by defending a minimal number of measurements,
the grid operator can enforce an equilibrium in which the at-
tacker’s have no effect on the system. In addition, our results shed
the light on the adversarial behavior in between the attackers.
The results show that, at equilibrium, the attackers can choose
attack strategies that cancel each other out resulting in no effect
on the grid. In addition, we analyze the equilibrium of the hybrid
game and compare the obtained solution to the Stackelberg
one. In this regard, we define a “price of information” index
which compares the utility achieved by the defender under the
Stackelberg model and the hybrid model. Hence, it reflects the
loss that the defender can be subject to due to lack of information
about the potential reactions of the attackers to the different
defense strategies available to the defender.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the system model and problem formulation. Section III
introduces the formulated Stackelberg game and associated so-
lution. Section IV introduces our proposed hybrid model and
its solution concept. Section V provides numerical results while
conclusions are presented in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Energy Markets
Competitive energy markets’ architectures are often based
on day ahead (DA) and real time (RT) markets [8]. In the
DA market, the system operator issues hourly-based locational
marginal prices (LMPs), µDA, for the next operating day based
on the DA energy bids submitted by the participants [8]. The
market clearing process is performed by the grid operator
through the solution of a linearize Optimal Power Flow (DCOPF)
which returns the optimal dispatch for each of the generators
participating in the market and the DA LMP at each bus. The
most commonly used DCOPF formulation is as follows [8]:
min
P
G∑
i=1
Ci(Pi), (1)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
(Pi −Di) = 0, (2)
P
min
i 6 Pi 6 P
max
i ,∀i ∈ {1, · · · , G}, (3)
N∑
i=1
(Pi −Di)χl,i 6 F
max
l ,∀l ∈ {1, · · · , L}, (4)
−
N∑
i=1
(Pi −Di)χl,i 6 F
max
l ,∀l ∈ {1, · · · , L}, (5)
where N,G and L represent, respectively, the number of buses,
generators, and transmission lines. Ci corresponds to the offer of
generator i while Pi and Di are, respectively, the power injection
and load at a bus i. Thus, Pi = 0 (Di = 0) corresponds to the
case in which no generator (or load) is connected to bus i. The
upper and lower limits on generator i’s output are denoted by
Pmini and Pmaxi . Constraints (4) and (5) place a limit, Fmaxl , on
the level of power that can flow over line l. A reference direction
is assigned to the power flow over each transmission line. In this
regard, a power flow opposing its assigned reference direction
is represented by a negative quantity. Hence, constraints (4) and
(5) correspond to the thermal limit of a line in its reference and
opposite directions respectively. X is the generation shift factor
matrix which defines the sensitivity of the power flow over each
line, F , to changes in power injection, P , at each bus:
F (L×1) =X(L×G) × P (G×1). (6)
Therefore the sensitivity of the flow over line l to a change in
power injection at bus i is denoted by χl,i.
In the RT market, actual real-time operating conditions esti-
mated using the state estimator, in lieu of the predictions in DA,
are used through an ex-post model to compute the RT LMPs,
µRT [8]. An incremental DCOPF is used to compute the RT
LMPs and can be formulated as follows [8]:
min
∆P
G∑
i=1
C
RT
i (∆Pi), (7)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
(∆Pi) = 0, (8)
∆Pmini 6 ∆Pi 6 ∆P
max
i ,∀i ∈ {1, · · · , G}, (9)
N∑
i=1
(∆Pi)χl,i 6 0,∀l ∈ C
+
, (10)
−
N∑
i=1
(∆Pi)χl,i 6 0, ∀l ∈ C
−
, (11)
where CRTi is the RT offer of generator i which is computed
using its RT power output and its associated offer curve [8].
C+ (C−) is the set of congested lines which flow is in (oppo-
site to) their reference directions. ∆Pmaxi and ∆Pmini define a
bandwidth which is employed to allow for solution tolerance.
In practice, here, we typically [9] set ∆Pmini = −2 MW and
∆Pmaxi = +0.1 MW. A proposed alternative to using this
feasibility bandwidth is also available in [9].
Thus, the DA and RT LMPs at each bus, i, are computed
using the DA and ex-post DCOPFs. The generated LMPs reflect,
both, the incremental cost of energy at bus i and the congestion
cost associated with the contribution of this bus to the system
congestion. A line is said to be congested if the flow of power
over it reaches its maximum limit. The DA and RT LMPs at bus
i are given by:
µDAi = λ0 +
L∑
l=1
(λDA,−l − λ
DA,+
l )χl,i, (12)
µRTi = λ0 +
∑
l∈Cl
(λRT,−l − λ
RT,+
l )χl,i. (13)
Cl , {C
+ ∪ C−} is the set of congested lines, in RT, obtained
using the state estimator. Cl ⊆ L where L = {1, · · · , L} is the set
of all lines. λ0 corresponds to the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the energy balance constraints (2) and (8). λDA,+l and
λDA,−l are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding, respectively,
to constraints (4) and (5) for line l ∈ L whereas λRT,+l and
λRT,−l are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding, respectively,
to constraints (10) and (11) for line l ∈ Cl. When l ∈ L
but l /∈ Cl, λRT,+l = λ
RT,−
l = 0. Moreover, when l ∈ C+,
λRT,−l = 0; while when l ∈ C−, λ
RT,+
l = 0.
Computing the RT LMPs relies on the ex-post DCOPF formu-
lation which depends on the output of the state estimator. Hence,
data injection attacks targeting the state estimation affects the
LMPs in (13). Next, we introduce the data attack model.
B. State Estimation and Data Injection Attacks
A power system state estimator uses multiple power mea-
surements collected throughout the grid to estimate the system
states [10]. The relation between the measurement vector, z, and
the vector of system states, θ, in a linearized state estimation
model (DC SE) is expressed as follows:
z =Hθ + e, (14)
where H is the measurement Jacobian matrix and e is the
vector of random errors assumed to follow a normal distribution,
N(0,R). Using a weighted least square (WLS) estimator the
estimated system states are given by [10]:
θˆ = (HTR−1H)−1HTR−1z =Mz. (15)
Using the estimated states, an estimate of the measurement
vector, zˆ, and residuals, r, can be calculated as follows [10]:
zˆ =Hθˆ = Sz, r = z − zˆ = (In − S)z =Wz, (16)
where In is the identity matrix of size (n×n), and n is the total
number of collected measurements.
When data injection attacks are concurrently carried out by
M attackers in the set M = {1, . . . ,M}, the collected measure-
ments are modified through the addition of their corresponding
attack vectors denoted by {z(1), z(2), ..., z(M)} resulting in the
following altered measurements and residuals:
zatt = z +
M∑
i=1
z(i), ratt = r +W
M∑
m=1
z(m). (17)
In the case in which the measurement errors e follow a normal
distribution, the WLS estimator is a maximum likelihood esti-
mator of location of the system states [10]. However, the WLS
estimator has a zero robustness against outliers. To overcome
this drawback, outliers detection and identification mechanisms
are used so that the final state estimate is only based on good
data. The measurement residuals give an indication of the real
and unknown measurement errors. By replacing the expression
of z from (14) in the expression of r in (16), the residuals can
be expressed in terms of the true errors as follows [10]:
r =We (18)
Thus, an analysis of the residuals allow for the detection
and identification of bad data (outliers). In this respect, bad
data detection corresponds to determining whether the collected
measurement set contains bad data or not. On the other hand, bad
data identification corresponds to identifying which measure-
ments may contain bad data. One should note here that outliers
can stem from data injection as well as other reasons such as
meter biases or communication link failures [10].
Bad data detection is typically performed using a test known
as the Chi-squares test over the sum of the squares of the
residuals [1], [10]. In fact, when the measurement errors vector
e is assumed to follow a normal distribution, ||r||22 =
∑n
i=1 r
2
i
follows a χ2 distribution with n−Nθ degrees of freedom where
Nθ is the number of states to be estimated [10]. Hence, for a
measurement set to be considered free from bad data, the resid-
uals must satisfy ||r||2 ≤ τ where τ is a detection threshold [1],
[10]. In this respect, in the presence of M attackers, and since
||ratt||2 = ||r+W
∑M
m=1 z
(m)||2 as shown in (17), each attacker
m ∈M should regulate Wz(m) to keep the effect of the attacks
on the residuals low to minimize the chance of being detected
as outliers [1].
In the case where the Chi-squares test indicates the presence
of bad data, various bad data identification and elimination tests
can be employed such as the largest normalized residual test,
or the hypothesis testing identification (HTI), among others, to
identify and eliminate the outliers [10].
In our model, each attacker m ∈ M aims at manipulating
RT LMPs, µRT , to make financial benefit via virtual bidding.
Using virtual bidding, entities that do not own any physical
generation nor load can engage in the energy market settlements
by submitting so-called virtual supply and demand offers. Since
these energy offers are virtual, an entity offering to buy (sell)
virtual power at a given bus in DA is required to sell (buy)
that same amount of power at the same bus in RT. Using such
virtual bids, the grid operator aims at promoting liquidity in
the energy market while, on the other hand, virtual bidders
aim to reap financial profit from possible mismatch between
the DA and RT LMPs [8]. Using a data injection attack, a
virtual bidder can, thus, manipulate the RT LMPs to create a
lucrative mismatch with respect to their DA counterparts. On
the other hand, to achieve pricing integrity, the system operator
aims at protecting the system against such attacks. The strategic
interactions between the attackers and the defender (i.e. system
operator) are modeled and analyzed next.
III. ATTACKERS AND DEFENDER STRATEGIC INTERACTION
Data injection attacks involve interactions between M attack-
ers, which are virtual bidders, and one defender consisting of
the grid operator. The defender chooses a set of measurements
to secure against potential attacks aiming at decreasing the
aggregate effect of the multiple attacks on the system. Securing
measurements to block data injection attacks is discussed in [2]
and the techniques that can be implemented for securing those
measurements are referred to in [2], [5], and [11]. In [2] and [11],
protection of measurements is performed through encryption of
the associated sensors while, in [5], protection of measurements
is performed through the implementation of a set of highly
secured measurement units which are assumed to provide more
robustness against data attacks. In any case, in practice, attackers
can have the ability to detect or watch which measurements
are secured by the defender. In fact, a placement of new
measurement units can be physically noticeable by the attackers
while encrypting the measurement sensors’ outputs can also be
observed by a hacker attempting to read these outputs.
After observing which measurements are secured, each of the
M attackers can choose, accordingly, to carry out a data injection
attack over a subset of measurements. Given the networked
nature of the electric grid, the actions and payoffs of the different
attackers are interconnected thus motivating a game-theoretic
approach [12].
Hence, given that the defender acts first and the attackers
react to the observed defender’s action, the interaction between
the defender and attackers is hierarchical. Thus, we formulate
a single leader, multi-follower Stackelberg game [12] between
the defender and the M attackers to capture and analyze the
strategic interaction between the two. In this game, the defender
acts as a leader who selects a set of measurements to defend
while the adversaries interact with one another using a followers
noncooperative game to identify the optimal attack in response to
the strategy of the defender. By observing or predicting the ways
in which the attackers react to its defense strategy, the leader
chooses its optimal defense action. Next, we first analyze and
solve the followers game and then find the Stackelberg solution.
A. Attackers’ Noncooperative Game Formulation
We formulate a strategic noncooperative game to analyze the
optimal decision making of the M attackers in response to any
arbitrary defender strategy. This game is formulated in its normal
form as follows: Ξ = 〈M, (Z(i))i∈M, (Ui)i∈M〉, where M is
the set of M attackers, Z(i) is the set of actions (attack vectors
z(i) ∈ Z(i)) available to attacker i ∈ M, and Ui is the utility
function of attacker i. Thus, each attacker, m ∈ M, selects an
attack vector, z(m) ∈ Z(m) that maximizes its utility Um. Let
Km denote the subset of measurements that m can attack. Then,
Z(m) can be represented by a column vector with elements equal
to 0 except for those in Km which can take values within a
compact range reflecting the range of magnitude of the attack.
The utility function of each attacker reflects the financial
benefit obtained by virtual bidding. Using virtual bidding, each
attacker m buys and sells Pm MW at, respectively, buses im
and jm in DA while, conversely in RT, attacker m sells and
buys Pm MW at, respectively, buses im and jm. Thus, the goal
of attacker m ∈ M is to optimize the following (Problem 1):
max
z
(m)∈Z(m)
Um(z
(m), z−(m))=
[
(µRTim −µ
DA
im
)+
(µDAjm −µ
RT
jm
)
]
Pm−cm(z
(m)),
(19)
s.t. ‖Wz(m)‖2 +
M∑
l=1,l 6=m
‖Wz(l)‖2 6 ǫm, (20)
where cm(z(m)) is the cost of attack, and z−(m) denotes
the strategy vector of all players except m. The number of
measurements that can be attacked concurrently by m as well
as the attack levels (the level of modification of a measurement)
are limited by Z(m). Since ||ratt||2 = ||r+W
∑M
m=1 z
(m)||2 ≤
||r||2 + ||Wz
(m)||2 +
∑M
l=1,l 6=m ||Wz
(l)||2, m ∈ M chooses
z(m) as in (20), where ǫm is a chosen threshold, to minimize
the chance of the attack of being detected as outliers.
B. Attackers’ Game Analysis
Due to the networked nature of the electric grid, the m
attackers’ actions are interdependent. In fact, by altering a set
of measurements, an attacker manipulates the whole estimation
outcome and, thus, affects the actions as well as the payoffs
of the other attackers. In the event of concurrent attacks by M
attackers, the resulting estimates, zˆatt, are computed as follows:
zˆ
att = zˆ +
M∑
m=1
Sz(m) ⇒ ∆zˆ =
M∑
m=1
Sz(m), (21)
where ∆zˆ represents the change in the generated estimates due to
the M attacks. Likewise, the overall change in the measurement
residuals due to the M attacks can be expressed as follows:
∆r =W
M∑
m=1
z(m). (22)
Consequently, the various attackers in the system can impair
the ability of attacker m to successfully manipulate a targeted
measurement zi as expressed in Remark 1.
Remark 1: Depending on the targeted measurements, the
collective impact of the M attacks can be either constructive for
the attackers by helping each one of them to achieve its goal, or
destructive, attenuating the global effect of these attacks on the
system.
In fact, considering the case of two attackers in which attacker
1’s (attacker 2’s) aim is to increase the estimated flow, zˆi (zˆj),
over a line li (lj) in order to create a false congestion. The
objective of attacker 1 (attacker 2) is, hence, to achieve ∆zˆi >
Fmaxli − zˆi (∆zˆj > F
max
lj
− zˆj). Following from (21), the change
introduced to zˆi and zˆj by the two attacks is stated as follows:
∆zˆi = si,iz
(1)
i + si,jz
(2)
j , ∆zˆj = sj,jz
(2)
j + sj,iz
(1)
i , (23)
where si,j denotes element (i, j) of matrix S. When the mea-
surement errors are independent and identically distributed (i.e.
R = σ2In), S is a symmetric matrix. This property can be
proven based on (15) and (16) through showing that ST = S
when R = σ2In. Since S is symmetric, si,j = sj,i. In the event
where si,j < 0, both attackers’ actions attenuate the effect of one
another. In fact, since si,j < 0, z(2)j (z(1)i ) reduces ∆zˆi (∆zˆj)
preventing it from causing any congestion over line li (lj). In the
contrary, if sij > 0, each of the attackers’ actions would assist
the other in achieving its objective. This result can be trivially
generalized to the case of M attackers.
Moreover, the payoffs of the different attackers (i.e. virtual
bidders) are also significantly interdependent. In fact, as shown
next, an attacker can collect financial benefit or endure loses due
to the strategies played by other attackers.
Remark 2: The payoff of each attacker, m, is dependent on
the chosen attack strategies of other attackers. Thus, based on
its virtual biding nodes, m can achieve a positive or negative
payoff depending on attacks carried out by other attackers.
In this regard, following from (19), attacker m’s payoff in the
presence of M attackers is governed by:
ζm = (µ
RT
im
− µDAim ) + (µ
DA
jm
− µRTjm ). (24)
Replacing the expressions of the DA and RT LMPs from (12)
and (13) in (24) yields:
ζm=
L∑
l=1
[(χl,jm−χl,im)×((λ
DA,−
l − λ
DA,+
l )+(λ
RT,+
l −λ
RT,−
l ))].
(25)
As a result, following the sign of (χl,jm −χl,im), determined
by the choice of virtual bid nodes im and jm, an attack modifying
the congestion status of a line l between DA and RT can
introduce a positive or negative payoff to attacker m.
C. Attackers’ Game Solution
The attackers’ payoff in (19) is a function of DA and RT
LMPs. These LMPs are indirectly controlled by the attack
vector, z(m), which can control the existence of congestion over
transmission lines and hence eventually affect the LMPs in (12)
and (13). Thus, (19) can be rewritten using (12) and (13) as:
Um(z
(m), z−(m)) = ζm Pm − cm(z
(m)), (26)
where ζm is given by (25). By dropping Pm for being a constant,
the objective of attacker m is hence to
max
z
(m)∈Z(m)
ζm − cm(z
(m)). (27)
We define the two sets of lines L+m and L−m such that L+m =
{l ∈ L|χl,jm−χl,im > 0} and L−m = {l ∈ L|χl,jm−χl,im < 0}.
Moreover, let LR and LO , such that L = {LR ∪ LO}, be the
sets of lines over which the power flows in, respectively, the
reference and opposite to reference directions.
Attacker m seeks to congest or decongest lines in a way that
maximizes (27). In this regard, for a line l ∈ L+m, i.e. χl,jm −
χl,im > 0, attacker m profits from creating a congestion over l
in the reference direction, causing λRT,+l to be positive. Thus,
m aims at creating a congestion over a line l ∈ {L+m ∩ LR}.
Similarly, for l ∈ L−m, m benefits from causing a congestion
over line l in the direction opposite to its reference direction,
causing λRT,−l to be positive. Accordingly, m aims a creating
a congestion over a line l ∈ {L−m ∩ LO}. Combining these two
observations, attacker m aims at creating congestions over lines
l ∈ {(L+m ∩L
R)∪ (L−m ∩L
O)}. In a similar manner, an attacker
would also seek to remove congestion from a line l in order to
set its λRT,+l or λ
RT,−
l to zero in a way that maximizes (27).
To this end, m aims at removing congestions from lines l ∈
{(L+m ∩ L
O) ∪ (L−m ∩ L
R)}.
However, due to the presence of measurement errors, an
attacker cannot be completely certain that its attack will lead
to the creation or removal of congestion over a given line. In
fact, given the estimated states in the presence of attack, θˆ
att
,
the power flow estimates, Fˆ
att
, can be obtained using the linear
matrix denoted by HF relating the power flows to the system
states: Fˆ
att
=HF θˆ
att
. Using the expressions of θˆ given by (15),
Fˆ
att
=HFM(z +
M∑
i=1
z(i)) = Fˆ +HFM
M∑
i=1
z(i). (28)
Replacing z by its expression given by (14) and noting that
MH reduces to the identity matrix, Fˆ
att
can be expressed as:
Fˆ
att
=HFθ +HFMe+HFM
M∑
i=1
z(i). (29)
HFθ represents the true flow denoted by F t. Given that e ∼
N(0,R), Fˆ
att
is also a random variable that is also Gaussian
distributed with the following expected value and variance:
E[Fˆ
att
] = F t +HFM
M∑
i=1
z(i), V [Fˆ
att
] =HFMR. (30)
Given that Fˆ
att
is a vector of random variables, attacker m
aims at altering the expected value of Fˆ
att
to achieve, with
highest possible probability, the intended congestion creation or
removal to maximize (26). In other words, to create (or remove)
a congestion over a line l, attacker m designs its attack so that
E[Fˆ attl ] > F
max
l + δm (or E[Fˆ attl ] 6 Fmaxl − δm) and aims
at maximizing this δm to increase its chances for achieving
its congestion. Thus, attacker m aims to solve the following
optimization problem where SF ,HFM (Problem 2):
max
z(m),δkm ,αkm
∑
km∈{L
+
m∪L
−
m}
(δkm − γαkm)− cm(z
(m)) (31)
s.t. ‖Wz(m)‖2 +
M∑
l=1,l 6=m
‖Wz(l)‖2 6 ǫm, (32)
Fˆkm + S
F
kmz
(m) +
∑
p∈M\{m}
S
F
kmz
(p) > Fmaxkm + δkm − αkm
∀km ∈ {L
+
m ∩ L
R}, (33)
Fˆkm + S
F
kmz
(m) +
∑
p∈M\{m}
S
F
kmz
(p) 6 −(Fmaxkm + δkm) + αkm
∀km ∈ {L
−
m ∩ L
O}, (34)
Fˆkm + S
F
kmz
(m) +
∑
p∈M\{m}
S
F
kmz
(p) 6 Fmaxkm − δkm + αkm
∀km ∈ {L
−
m ∩ L
R}, (35)
Fˆkm + S
F
kmz
(m) +
∑
p∈M\{m}
S
F
kmz
(p) > −(Fmaxkm − δkm)− αkm
∀km ∈ {L
+
m ∩ L
O}, (36)
0 < δkm 6 βF
max
km ∀δkm , 0 < αkm 6 β
′
F
max
km ∀αkm , (37)
where z(m) ∈ Z(m). The constraints in (37) put some limits
on the variables δkm and αkm relative to the corresponding flow
limit Fmaxkm where β and β
′ correspond to the fraction of Fmaxkm
that δkm and αkm can take respectively. Thus, attacker m aims at
maximizing δkm to increase the chance of creating congestions
over lines km ∈ {(L+m ∩ LR) ∪ (L−m ∩ LO)} and removing
congestions from lines km ∈ {(L+m ∩ LO) ∪ (L−m ∩ LR)}.
On the other hand, due to resource limitation, an attacker can-
not concurrently achieve all its favorable congestions. Thus, the
αkm variables are relaxation variables to ensure feasibility of the
optimization problem. However, this relaxation is accompanied
with a penalty factor, γ, present in the objective function which
reflects a decrease in the objective function of the attacker for
the case in which a beneficial congestion creation or removal is
not performed. Hence, when such a congestion manipulation is
feasible, this penalty factor ensures that the attacker has a high
incentive to perform this congestion manipulation.
Moreover, similarly to (19), cm(z(m)) is the cost associated
with the attack. This cost function can be represented as a scaled
norm of the attack vector, where κm is the scaling factor and
ml is the length of vector z(m):
cm(z
(m)) = κm
ml∑
i=1
(z
(m)
i )
2. (38)
Following this formulation, one can see that the constraints of
the optimization problems of each of the attackers are coupled.
In other words, the strategy space of each attacker depends on
the strategies selected by the other attackers. Games in which
the constraints of the different players are coupled are known as
generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEP). A widely used
solution concept of these games is known as the generalized
Nash equilibrium (GNE) which is defined as follows [13]:
Definition 1: In a game of N players in which the control
variable, i.e. strategy, of each player i ∈ {1, ..., N}, is denoted by
xi ∈ Rni and utility function is denoted by Ui : Rn1+...+nN →
R, a GNE is a state of the game in which each player aims at
max
x
i
Ui(x
i,x∗,−i) s.t. (xi,x∗,−i) ∈ X , (39)
where x∗,−i denotes the optimal strategies of all other players
except for player i and X is the shared strategy space in between
the N players. In other words, as a response to optimal chosen
actions of other players, a player aims at choosing the strategy, in
the restricting subset dictated by the choice of the other players,
that maximizes its own utility.
We next prove the existence of a GNE for the attackers’ game.
Theorem 1: The attackers’ game has at least one GNE.
Proof: Since δkm and αkm are linear functions and
−cm(z
(m)) is a summation of strictly concave functions, as
shown in (38), each attacker’s utility function given in (31) is
a continuous and strictly concave function over the attackers’
strategy profile. Moreover, Zm is a convex and compact set,
and as shown in (37), the sets in which δkm and αkm lie are
also compact and convex. Thus, since a GNEP having compact
and convex action sets as well as continuous and quasi-concave
utility functions has at least one GNE [14] [15, Theorem 4.1],
our attackers’ game has at least one GNE.
The solution to GNEP problems can be obtained using a number
of widely adopted solution concepts that are available in liter-
ature [13], [15], [16] where the applicability of each technique
depends on the characteristics of the utility functions and action
spaces. Given the strict concavity of the utility function of each
attacker’s problem and the convexity of the action space, such
techniques converge to a GNE for our derived formulation.
D. Defender’s Side Analysis
Under a given equilibrium of the followers, the leader (grid
operator) selects a defense vector a0 that determines which
measurements are to be made secure and able to block potential
attacks. The objective of the defender is to minimize a cost
function capturing the variation between the DA and RT LMPs,
on all N buses in the system, as follows:
min
a0∈A0
U0(a0,a−0)=PL
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(µRTi −µ
DA
i )
2+c0(a0), (40)
s.t ‖a0‖0 6 B0, (41)
where c0(a0) is the cost of defense, PL is the total system load
and B0 is the limit on the number of measurements that the
operator can defend simultaneously. In (40), µRTi depends on
the strategies taken by the defender, a0, and attackers, a−0 ,
{z(1), z(2), ..., z(M)}.
The Stackelberg solution concept is adequate for games with
hierarchy in which the leader enforces its strategy and the
followers respond, rationally (i.e. optimally), to the leader’s
strategy [12]. We denote the optimal response of the attack-
ers to action a0 played by the defender by Ratt(a0) ,
{z(1)
∗
(a0), z
(2)∗(a0), · · · , z
(M)∗(a0)}. This optimal strategy
denotes the equilibrium strategy profile of the attackers as a
response to the defender’s strategy. In this regard, a∗0 ∈ A0
is a Stackelberg equilibrium if it minimizes the leader’s (i.e.
defender’s) utility function U0. In other words,
U0(a
∗
0,R
att(a∗0)) 6 U0(a0,R
att(a0)) ∀a0 ∈ A0. (42)
A Stackelberg equilibrium is guaranteed to exist and be unique
if the optimal response of the followers is unique in response
to every action of the leader. However, Theorem 1 proves the
existence of at least one GNE for the attackers’ game. Hence,
the followers can have multiple optimal responses to a leaders
strategy. In this case, the leader can rank the GNEs corresponding
to each strategy based on their impact on its utility and retain
the one that leads to the worst utility (i.e. maximal utility given
that the defender is a utility minimzer). The leader then selects
the policy that minimizes this maximal utility. This is known as
a hierarchical equilibrium (HE) [12]. In other words, a0 ∈ A0
is a hierarchical equilibrium strategy for the defender if:
max
a
−0∈R
att(a∗0)
U0(a
∗
0,a−0) = min
a0∈A0
max
a
−0∈R
att(a0)
U0(a0,a−0). (43)
E. Distributed Learning Algorithm
Here, we provide a methodology for finding a hierarchical
equilibrium of the defender-attackers game as defined by (43).
We first consider the attackers subgame. To find an equilibrium
that can be reached by the attackers, we propose a distributed
learning algorithm, based on the framework of learning automata
that was first analyzed in [17]. The main drivers behind this
algorithm are as follows. First, this algorithm is fully distributed
in the sense that each attacker is only required to know its own
action space, and not the shared one, and the observation of its
own payoff after choosing an action. In this regard, knowledge
of the action spaces of other attackers or even their existence
is not required. Second, since the attackers’ game might admit
multiple GNEs, the use of this algorithm, emulating practical
smart grids security settings, enables the characterization of the
GNE(s) that can be actually reached in practice.
The proposed learning algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. In
this algorithm, each attacker m first initializes a strategy vector
q(m) containing a probability distribution over its attack space1.
For instance, q(m)
z
(m)(t) corresponds to the probability that attacker
m chooses attack z(m) at time instant t. Then, at time instant
t, each attacker chooses an attack randomly and independently
from its attack space following the probability distribution avail-
able through its strategy vector. The collection of the attackers’
actions at time instant t results in a payoff for each attacker
denoted by rm(t). rm(t) is a positive normalized value which
corresponds to a mapping from [Uminm , Umaxm ]→ [0, 1] where Uminm
and Umaxm are the minimum and maximum achievable utilities by
1This algorithm requires decritization of the action space of the attackers; our
discretization approach is provided in Section V.
Algorithm 1 Distributed Learning Automata
Input: Number of attackers M
Action space of each attacker Z(m)
Output: Strategy vector of each player q(m)
1: Initialize q(m)(0)
2: while Not Converged do
3: Randomly select z(m)(t) based on q(m)(t)
4: Collect payoff rm(t)
5: Update strategy vector
q(m)(t+ 1) = q(m)(t) + b rm(t)
(
e(m)(t)− q(m)(t)
)
6: Check Convergence
7: if Converged then
8: Break
9: end if
10: end while
11: return Strategy vector q(m)
m. Based on the payoff that it receives at time instant i, each
attacker, m ∈ M, updates its strategy vector as follows:
q(m)(t+ 1) = q(m)(t) + b rm(t)(e
(m)(t)− q(m)(t)), (44)
where b is an arbitrarily small positive constant and e(m)(t) is
a column vector of length equal to the size of the action set
of attacker m. e(m)(t) is a vector whose elements are equal
to 0 except for the element corresponding to the action that
was selected at time instant t. The element corresponding to
the selected action will have a value of 1. Thus, given that the
jth attack was selected by attacker m at time instant t; then,
e
(m)
j (t) = 1 and e
(m)
k (t) = 0 for k 6= j. This updating scheme is
known as a linear reward-inaction (LR−I) scheme [17]. Hence,
with every iteration, the strategy vector of each attacker is
updated and the algorithm repeats until each of the attackers’
strategy vectors has all elements equal to 0 except for one
element which is equal to 1. Such a strategy vector shows which
of the strategies is to be chosen by each attacker. The collection
of these attacks (having a probability of 1 each) corresponds
to the game’s equilibrium. This algorithm has been discussed in
[17], [18] where it has been proven that, for an arbitrarily small b,
this algorithm asymptotically converges to a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (PSNE) when the game admits a PSNE.
Definition 2: Following the notations of Definition 1 a PSNE
is a state of the game in which each player aims at
max
x
i
Ui(x
i,x∗,−i) s.t. xi ∈ Xi, (45)
where, on the contrary with GNEP, Xi is player i’s own strategy
space which is independent of other players.
Thus, the main difference between a GNE and a PSNE is
that the GNE is an optimal action profile in which each action
does not violate coupled constraints with other players. Thus,
given that Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to converge to a PSNE,
proving that this PSNE will never violate the coupled constraints
is enough to prove the convergence to a GNE.
Theorem 2: When applied to Problem 1, Algorithm 1 is
guaranteed to asymptotically converge to a GNE when the step
size b is chosen to be arbitrarily small.
Proof: For a strategy z(m)∗ to be a best response strat-
egy (BR) for attacker m, it needs to satisfy the property
Um(z
(m)∗ , z−(m)) ≥ Um(z
(m), z−(m))∀z(m) ∈ Z(m). A
PSNE is hence a state of the game in which all players play
BR strategies with respect to one another. Thus, a strategy that
is not a BR strategy cannot be a PSNE strategy.
However, a strategy z(m) that violates the residual threshold
constraints in (20) cannot be a BR strategy. In fact, consider the
case in which attacker m attacks only one measurement zi and
its attack is denoted by z(m)i . If this attack violates the residual
threshold of zi, zi will be identified as outlier and discarded from
the measurement set. Thus, from (27), this results in
Um(z
(m)
i , z
−(m)) = ζmPm − cm(z
(m))
< ζmPm = Um(0, z
−(m)).
Thus, z(m) is not a BR since not launching an attack at all
returns a higher Um. Hence, all actions that violate the coupled
constraints are dominated by the alternative of not carrying out
an attack at all and hence cannot correspond to BR strategies.
As a result, a PSNE is guaranteed not to violate the coupled
constraints in (20) and hence this PSNE is a GNE of the game.
Since all PSNEs are GNEs and that algorithm 1 asymptotically
converges to a PSNE for a small b it, as a result, converges to a
GNE of our game.
To be able to choose a hierarchical equilibrium strategy, a
defender needs to anticipate the worst case GNE of the attacker
to each defense strategy. This anticipation can be done through:
i) repeating the learning algorithm of the attackers, Algorithm
1, starting from different initial conditions to find all possible
GNEs from which worst case GNEs can be extracted, ii) using
one of the various algorithms tailored to find solutions of GNE
problems [13], [15], [16], iii) analytical derivation based on
its full knowledge of the cyber-physical system model, energy
market model and available past data.
When being able to anticipate all worst case GNEs of the
attackers, the defender chooses the strategy that results in the
best worst case GNE. This strategy and its corresponding GNE
corresponds to the HE of the game.
IV. GAME MODEL UNDER LIMITED INFORMATION
Thus far, we assumed that the defender can anticipate all
worst case GNEs of the attackers. However, in some instances,
the defender does not have enough knowledge to anticipate the
reaction of the attackers. Thus, it cannot seek a strategy that
minimizes its utility when the reaction of the followers to any
of its actions is unknown. As a result, we employ the framework
of satisfaction equilibrium (SE) [7], [19]. Under the satisfaction
framework, rather than minimizing its objective function (40),
given a number of measurements that can be defended concur-
rently, b0, the defender aims at keeping the overall changes in
the LMPs at all buses under a desired threshold Γ0:
r0(a0,a−0) =
N∑
i=1
(µRTi − µ
DA
i )
2 ≤ Γ0. (46)
Given our hierarchical model, we present a hybrid SE-Nash
model in which the defender aims at choosing an action that
satisfies its performance requirement given potential reaction
of the attackers while the attackers observe the action of the
defender and play a noncooperative game in which each attacker
aims at maximizing its utility. Extending the SE logic to the
attackers game, an attacker is satisfied by playing one of its BR
strategies facing the actions chosen by other attackers and the
defender. We denote an equilibrium of this hybrid model as a
hybrid hierarchical equilibrium (HHE).
Definition 3: A strategy profile (a∗0, z(1)
∗
, ..., z(M)
∗
) is an
HHE if r0(a∗0,a∗−0) ≤ Γ0 and Um(z(m)
∗
, z−(m)
∗
) >
Um(z
(m), z−(m)
∗
)∀z(m) ∈ Z(m) and m ∈ {1, ...,M}.
With a proper choice of Γ0 this game is guaranteed to have
at least one HHE. In fact, if none of the actions available to the
defender leads to meeting its satisfaction level then either the
satisfaction threshold needs to be increased or more resources
should be employed so that a larger number of measurements
can be concurrently secured. When the leader chooses an action
that satisfies (46) it has no incentive to deviate from it. The
attackers will respond to this strategy by playing a GNE. Hence,
the attackers would also have no incentive to deviate from this
GNE. As a result, the satisfaction strategy of the defender and
its GNE response by the attackers correspond to an HHE of this
hybrid game.
Given the lack of knowledge about the adversaries, the de-
fender has to learn the action(s) that insure the satisfaction of
its constraint through trial and observation. To this end, to find
a strategy that satisfies its performance constraint, the defender
can adopt the following search algorithm:
i) For a maximum number of iterations, N0, the defender
starts by choosing an action from its strategy space A0
following a uniform probability distribution f0 over this
action space. The followers observe this action and react by
playing a noncooperative game whose GNE is obtainable
via Algorithm 1.
ii) The leader observes if the action it had taken led to the
satisfaction of its performance constraint. If this is the case,
the strategy is hence deemed satisfactory and the leader
has no incentive to deviate from it. The followers response
to the leader’s satisfaction action is a GNE and hence the
followers have no incentive to deviate from their response
as well. Thus, this results in an equilibrium.
iii) If the action that the defender had chosen did not lead to
the satisfaction of its constraint, another action is randomly
chosen from its strategy space and the process repeats.
This algorithm will eventually find a HHE since, for a large
number of iterations and given that at least one action exists
in its action space that satisfies the defender’s threshold, this
action would eventually be randomly chosen with a probability
that is extremely close to 1. Assume the number of vulnerable
measurements to be equal to V and that the defender secures
b0 < V measurements concurrently. Its action space has then
a cardinality |A0| = V !/(b0!(V − b0)!). Assume that n0 of the
alternatives achieve r0 ≤ Γ0. Choosing uniformly between the
alternatives, the probability of choosing an action that satisfies
the defender is equal to p0 = n0/|A0|. Thus, the probability
of not finding a satisfaction action in N0 iterations, i.e. trials, is
given by (1−p0)N0 ; and hence, the probability of finding a satis-
faction action in N0 iterations is given by p∗0 = 1− (1− p0)N0 .
Moreover, the expected number of iterations needed to find a
satisfaction equilibrium strategy is equal to µ0 = 1/p0 while the
variance of that number is equal to v0 = (1− p0)/p20. Hence,
TABLE I
ATTACKERS’ VIRTUAL BIDDING CONFIGURATION
Attacker VB Bus 1 VB Bus2 Target Line
Attacker 1 Bus 3 Bus 4 Line 4
Attacker 2 Bus 4 Bus 12 Line 15
Attacker 3 Bus 6 Bus 7 Line 9
significantly increasing Γ0 will typically increase n0 leading to
an increase in p0 and p∗0 and a decrease in µ0 and v0. As a
result, one can see the conflicting effect between the quality
of the found solution, reflected by how low the satisfaction
threshold Γ0 is, and the speed of finding a solution. Reducing
the required satisfaction quality leads to finding a solution faster
while a higher satisfaction quality requirement (lower Γ0) leads
to a slower identification of a solution.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For performance evaluation, we consider three data injection
attackers and one defender interacting over the IEEE 30-bus test
system which represents a segment of the American Electric
Power System [20], [21].
In our numerical setting, each attacker is assumed to have
a subset of measurements comprising three measurements that
it can attack. In particular, attacker 1 can attack line flow
measurements over lines 3, 4 and 7, attacker 2 can attack line
flow measurements over lines 14, 15 and 16, and attacker 3
can attack line flow measurements over lines 5, 9 and 11. The
attack level on any of the measurements is assumed to have
one of the following power levels (in MW): {−3.5, 2, 0, 2, 3.5}.
The amount of virtual power that each attacker sells or buys is
assumed to be equal to 100 MW and its attack cost is as shown
in (38) where κm = 0.25. The DA and RT virtual bidding (VB)
information of the different attackers are shown in Table I. In
this table, VB Bus 1 corresponds to the bus at which an attacker
sells energy in DA (respectively buys in RT) and VB Bus 2
corresponds to the bus at which this attacker buys energy in DA
(respectively sells in RT). The target line column corresponds
to the line connecting the two VB buses which the attacker
aims to congest. In our simulations, we assume that the system
experiences no congestion in DA and that each attacker primarily
aims at creating a fake estimated congestion over its target line
so as to reap financial benefit2.
On the other hand, the defender decides on a subset of
measurements to secure out of all the measurements in the
system. In our simulations, we assume that a measurement device
is placed on every bus and every line in the system so that every
power injection and every line flow is measured.
In Fig. 1 we show the effect of each attacker’s optimal attack,
when no defense or other attackers are present in the system, on
the RT LMPs. As can be seen from Fig. 1, assuming that only
one attacker attacks at a time, the action of attacker 3 yields
the most detrimental effect on the system. This can be also seen
from Fig. 2 in which the impact of each of the attacks on the
system is shown. The global effect of any attack on the system is
captured by the defender’s utility function given in (40). Fig. 2
2Since our main focus is on the attackers’ and defender’s strategies, it is
assumed that all market participants abide by their DA schedules and, except for
the attacks and defense, no change in system conditions occurs between DA and
RT. Thus, in case of no attacks, the DA and RT LMPs match.
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shows indeed that the attack of 3 has the highest global effect
on the system followed by that of attacker 1 and of attacker
2 respectively. In fact, the defender’s loss under the attack of
attacker 3 is equal to $44.69 as compared to $11.61 under that
of attacker 1 and $5.74 under that of attacker 2.
Fig. 3 shows the effect that a congestion over the target line
of attacker j has on the payoff of attacker i denoted as Ui,j .
Accordingly, Fig. 3 shows how the attack of an attacker affects
the payoffs of the others. To this end, the attackers appear to be
in a perfectly conflicting situation since fulfilling the purpose of
an attacker i results in a negative payoff to all other attackers.
Next, we consider the strategic interactions between the three
attackers and the defender based on our Stackelberg model. In
this regard, we find the HE of the game, and the underlying
GNE of the attackers, when the defender defends an increasing
number of measurements as shown in Table II. We, namely,
treat the cases in which the number of measurements that can
be defended concurrently, B0, is 0, 1 and 2. The attackers’
optimal strategies are represented in a vector containing their
respective optimal attack levels (in MW) such that for attacker
TABLE II
STACKELBERG GAME SOLUTION FOR B0 = {0, 1, 2}
B0 Secured Measurements Attacker 1 Attacker 2 Attacker 3
0 - (2,3.5,3.5) (0,0,0) (3.5,3.5,0)
1 line 9 (0,3.5,2) (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
2 lines 4 and 5 (0,0,0) (0,2,0) (0,3.5,-3.5)
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1 the attacked levels correspond to additive power flows over
(line 3, line 4, line 7), for attacker 2 to additive power flows over
(line 14, line 15, line16) and for attacker 3 to additive power
flows over (line 5, line 9, line 11).
Given that a congestion occurring over line 9 has the largest
impact on the system, one can intuitively expect the defender
to secure the measurement over that line when only one mea-
surement can be secured (i.e. B0 = 1). Indeed, from Table II,
we can see that the HE corresponds to the defender defending
line 9 and the attackers carrying out their optimal equilibrium
response. For the case in which the defender can defend up to
two measurements concurrently, i.e. B0 = 2, one expects the
defender to secure the measurements of the two lines, lines 4
and 9, which congestion has the largest impact on the system
(we refer to this defense, in this context, as the critical defense).
However, the HE of the game corresponds to the defender
defending lines 4 and 5 instead. In fact, by defending those
two lines the attackers’ optimal response yields no effect on
the system hence leaving the RT LMPs unaffected. This is a
representation of the analysis provided through Remark 1 in
which multiple attackers’ attacks can cancel each other out.
Fig. 4 provides a comparison between the LMP manipulation
outcome under the HE strategy as compared to the critical
defense strategy. It can be clearly seen that the HE strategy (i.e.
Stackelberg solution) completely prevents the manipulation of
the RT LMPs and, hence, is a significantly better strategy than
critical defense. In fact, the attackers’ optimal response to the
critical defense strategy resulted in a successful manipulation
of the RT LMPs leading to a 3% root mean square deviation
(RMSD) from the DA LMPs where
RMSD =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(µRTi − µ
DA
i )
2. (47)
Fig. 5 shows the defender’s HE utility for different numbers
of concurrently defended measurements. This figure shows that
the attackers have a very large impact on the system when no
defensive actions are taken. In fact, the aggregate effect of the
0 1 2
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Number of defended measurements
Ag
gr
eg
at
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 ($
)
Role of defense in reducing attacks’ impact
Fig. 5. Effect of system defense
attacks on the system LMPs, at equilibrium, with no defensive
actions is $306. However, when B0 = 1 (defender is able to
secure one measurement), the HE of the game shows that the
global effect of the multiple data injections attacks on the system
drops significantly to $11.6. Moreover, when B0 = 2 (defender
is able to secure two measurements concurrently), the HE of the
game shows that the defender’s equilibrium strategy completely
protects the system against attacks and achieves a zero overall
effect of the attacks on the system.
We next consider our proposed SE-Nash framework and we
define the price of information (PI) to be an index reflecting the
loss that the defender endures due to its lack of information about
the possible reaction of the attackers to its defense strategies. The
PI is defined as follows:
PI = UHHE0 − U
HE
0 . (48)
The PI hence reflects the difference between the utility achieved
under the SE-Nash framework and the one achieved under the
Stackleberg model (corresponding to minimum possible utility).
We consider first that the defender can only defend one
measurement at a time. Given that there are 9 vulnerable
measurement units in the system, the defender has 9 options to
choose from. Considering that the defender would be satisfied
by having RMSD ≤ 10%, we run the search algorithm described
in Section IV and the HHE we obtained is similar to the one we
obtained using the Stackelberg model for B0 = 1. Thus, in this
case, PI = 0. Following this HHE, the defender defends the line
measurement over line 9 and the attackers’ GNE corresponds
to that shown in Table II for B0 = 1. This strategy generates
an RMSD = 6.1% < 10% hence meeting the performance
requirement.
Next, we consider the case in which the defender secures 2
measurements concurrently. Thus, the defender has 36 options
to choose from. We consider two different performance require-
ments. In the first, the defender seeks to have RMSD ≤ 5%.
Running the search algorithm yields an HHE dictating the
defense of lines 4 and 9 which corresponds to the critical defense
defined previously. This HHE results in RMSD = 3% < 5% and
a PI = $5.74. The second considered performance requirement
seeks to have RMSD ≤ 10%. In this regard, our search algorithm
led to an HHE under which lines 5 and 9 should be defended.
This HHE results in RMSD = 6.1% < 10% and a PI = $11.61.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the problem of data injection
attacks on the smart grid in the presence of multiple adversaries.
The strategic interactions between the defender and the attackers
have been modeled using a Stackelberg game and a hybrid satis-
faction equilibrium - Nash equilibrium game. In these games, the
grid operator acts as the leader and the attackers act as followers
which play a noncooperative strategic game in response to each
defender’s strategy. The costs of attack and defense have been
integrated in the utility functions of the players. We have proven
the existence of a generalized Nash equilibrium of the attackers’
game, studied the existence and properties of the equilibria of
the Stackelberg and the hybrid games and proposed learning
algorithms, and proved their convergence, to compute the games’
solutions. Numerical results have shown the critically important
role of the defender in protecting the grid and the potential
conflicting interaction between the multiple adversaries. Our
results also highlight potential loss that the defender can incur
due to a lack of information about the actions of the attackers.
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